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Kierkegaard Newsletter Ñ Issue 40: August 2000
Becoming a Self: A
Reading of KierkegaardÕs Concluding Unscientific Postscript. By Merold Westphal. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue
University Press, 1996. 261 p.
$38.95.
John Lippitt
University of Hertfordshire
United Kingdom
Written
in the engaging style which one has come to expect from Merold Westphal, this
highly lucid and enjoyable study will benefit readers of Kierkegaard at every
level from undergraduates upwards. Becoming a Self eschews the dangers
of biting off more Kierkegaardian text than one can hope adequately to chew
between the covers of one book, and limits itself to detailed commentary on the
Concluding Unscientific Postscript. WestphalÕs approach, announced at
the outset, is to focus on Johannes ClimacusÕs connections with postmodern
thinkers, as well as his confrontation with Hegel. The result is a running
dialogue with such figures as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas, as
well as Hegel. Amongst the themes which Westphal stresses is the essentially
relational nature of the self, and that KierkegaardÕs alleged ÔirrationalismÕ
is in fact a protest against Ôexorbitant claims made on behalf of human
thought that wishes to deify itselfÕ (p. ix). While these claims are hardly
new, the case for them is argued clearly and well, and it is worth making given
that ÔindividualismÕ and irrationalismÕ are charges upon which Kierkegaard so
often finds himself in the dock. This book is part of the Purdue University
Press Series in the History of Philosophy, the expressed aim of which is to
offer Ôwell-edited basic texts to be used in courses and seminars and for
teachers looking for a succinct exposition of the results of recent researchÕ.
In this respect, for the most part WestphalÕs work succeeds admirably. Students
will find him a helpful guide both to central themes of the Postscript,
and to its place in, and in relation to, the pseudonymous authorship as a
whole. The latter theme is set up by the first three chapters, which locate the
Postscript in relation to KierkegaardÕs biography (Chapter 1), the
pseudonymous authorship (Chapter 2) and the existence-spheres (Chapter 3). There
then follows a detailed commentary on successive sections of the text (Chapters
4 to 13), chapter headings being keyed into the HongsÕ translation. Finally, we
get a concluding Chapter 14 which suggests how Kierkegaard, in texts such as Works
of Love, goes ÔbeyondÕ ClimacusÕs Religiousness A and B to a ÔReligiousness
CÕ which expands his focus on the selfÕs relation to God to the importance of
relations to the neighbour, thus supporting WestphalÕs own text, the book
concludes with a huge chunk of the Postscript itself (the chapter on
ÔSubjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth is SubjectivityÕ). This strikes me as
unfortunate. While the reason for its inclusion is presumably that this is one
of the most commonly ÔtaughtÕ sections of the Postscript, the experienced
reader of that text knows Ð and the intelligent student reader of Westphal will
soon discover Ð that each section of the labyrinthine Postscript sheds
light on all the others. Thus immediately to flag one part as being more
important than another Ð which, whether intended or not, will be the result of
the inclusion of this ÔPart 3Õ Ð seems a questionable move.
Becoming
a Self has many
virtues. The chapter on pseudonymity, for instance, will be very useful to
readers approaching this issue for the first time, and the links between
Kierkegaard and Hegel, on the one hand, and postmodernism, on the other, are
very illuminating. But inevitably, there are points with which one might want
to take issue. One key matter which some recent work on the Postscript
has made much of is the peculiar structure of the book. Westphal is
alive to this, and he is often illuminating on the authorial strategies of
various sections. However, I suggest that his focus on the bookÕs structure
does not go as far as it might, and in particular, ClimacusÕs status as a
humorist Ð and what effect that might have on what he tells us about his
ostensible subject Ð is not fully probed. Of ClimacusÕs revocation of the text,
Westphal remarks: Ôsince we have no reason to think that he places them [the
ideas of Postscript] before us ironically, we can assume that he wants
to place them before us at face value.Õ (p. 193). But there is a long tradition
of giving reasons for reading the Postscript Ôironically,Õ of which
perhaps Henry E. Allison[i]
is the grandfather and James Conant the most influential recent exponent.[ii]
The two external appendices Ð ClimacusÕs ÔAn Understanding with the ReaderÕ and
KierkegaardÕs ÔA First and Last ExplanationÕ Ð together with the internal
appendix, ÔA Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish LiteratureÕ, are the
pivot around which ConantÕs reading revolves. Westphal treats these
structurally crucial sections too briefly. For instance, despite acknowledging
the ÔGlanceÕ as important, he spends barely more than a page on it. Moreover,
just before this, the Ôgraveyard sceneÕ in which Climacus tells how he came to
his ÔtaskÕ of aiming to Ôfind out where the misunderstanding between
speculative thought and Christianity liesÕ (CUP 241) is described in
parentheses as Ôa story that speaks for itself and needs no commentaryÕ (p.
129). Really? At least one commentatory in the Allison-Conant tradition,
Stephen Mulhall, considers this scene to be of singular importance. It is, for
Mulhall, the Ôgive-awayÕ which is intended finally to reveal to us what we may
have come to suspect: that ClimacusÕs project is not what it seems; that he is
prey to the same philosophical confusions about the religious that he warns us
against, and therefore becomes (deliberately, according to Mulhall) as comical
a figure as the Hegelians he caricatures.[iii]
I do not myself in the end side with this interpretative tradition, but it is
one that deserves to be considered, not least because it usefully draws our
attention to just how important the stylistic and structural dimensions of the Postscript
are, and just how much might hinge on ClimacusÕs being a humorist. ClimacusÕs
problematic sense of himself could go far deeper than WestphalÕs reading
allows.
Another
point that made me uneasy is that there seems to be a tension in WestphalÕs
account of the Climacean leap. I think he is right to want to resist the
caricature of a leap that is Ôblind,Õ and also to resist Ð along with
commentators such as C. Stephen Evans and M. Jamie Ferreira Ð direct
volitionalist interpretations. Yet in doing so, he at one point claims that
Ôone leaps in the full knowledge of both the leap itself and its hope for
destinationÕ (p. 78, my emphasis). This last phrase puzzles me, and it does
not seem to sit happily with WestphalÕs overall account in this section.
Westphal acknowledges that in the case of Christianity Ôthe landing site is
held to resist conceptual mastery by virtue of its paradoxical characterÕ, but
points out that Climacus does Ôeverything [he] can to make the paradox as
conspicuous as possibleÕ (p. 78). But pointing up the paradoxicality of a
destination can hardly be conflated with having Ôfull knowledgeÕ of it. Suppose
we find persuasive the idea that the existential destination of the leap might
only fully be available to one after the leap has been made or Ð as Ferreira
suggests Ð that it is Ônot a case of seeing before you leap, or leaping before
you see [but rather that] the new seeing is the leap in understanding.Õ[iv]
Such readings seem more plausible: could a full existential ÔunderstandingÕ of a
Chirsitian worldview be available to someone not oriented to a Christian way of
being-in-the-world? It seems to me crucial to understanding the Postscript
to see that there are aspects of religious Ðespecially Christian Ð existence
that remain an enigma to Climacus.
Nevertheless,
even if these criticisms are fair, they should not be allowed to detract from a
fine, detailed and in places genuinely witty commentary, which admirably
manages to provide something for readers from college level up to specialist
researcher. WestphalÕs book should be highly commended.
[i] Henry E. Allison, ÔChristianity and NonsenseÕ, Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 20 (1967), pp. 432-460.
[ii] James Conant ÔMust We Show What We Cannot Say?Õ in R. Fleming and M. Payne (eds), The Senses of Stanley Cavell (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989), ÔKierkegaard, Wittgenstein and NonsenseÕ in Ted Cohen, Paul Guyer and Hilary Putnam (eds) Pursuits of Reason (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993), and ÔPutting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point of View for Their Work as AuthorsÕ in Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr (eds), Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief (Basingstoke: Macmillian, 1995).
[iii] See Stephen Mulhall, Faith and Reason (London: Duckworth, 1994), Chapter 3, especially pp. 51-2.
[iv] M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 111.