| In retrospect: This is a classic case of conflict in development. Deforestation is perpetuated by traditional economic growth (i.e. logging,
cattle ranching ), which was also harming indigenous Amazonian people and poor non-indigenous rubber tappers. This conflict involves issues of environmental destruction and sustainability, culture clash, human rights violations, class issues, transnational politics...These are all issues caught up in development. I wrote this paper as I was thinking of designing a CIS major, it was part of my inspiration.
Influential Actors in the Conflict over Amazonian Deforestation in Brazil
ES 201—Lott, December 13, 2003
Introduction: The what, how and why of Brazilian deforestation
Industrialization has encouraged destruction of the world’s forests and deforestation has become an increasingly pressing issue. In recent decades the international community has turned its attention to conserving its forests, particularly rainforests. One of the key issues that emerged in the growing American environmental movement in the1980’s was deforestation of the Amazon rainforest, the majority of which is in Brazil. Although Amazonian deforestation had been going on for some time, opposition to it did not enter the political or global arena until the 1980’s when international actors began advocating for its conservation.
Philip Fearnside, an ecologist who works for the National Institute for Research in the Amazon (INPA), is an excellent source for scientific explanations of the destructiveness of Amazonian deforestation. Fearnside explains that rainforests are crucial to the global environment as they act as carbon sinks, maintain the water cycle and that they are also rich in biodiversity. Deforestation removes nutrients from the soil and causes erosion. Erosion runs off into the rivers and decreases evapotranspiration, which changes the flood system. Less evapotranspiration affects the dry season too because there is less rainfall as a result. Deforestation also threatens the biodiversity of the Amazon and it destroys useful resources, such as latex and pharmaceutical products and destroys the livelihood and home of human inhabitants of the forest. It is the gravity of these effects that attracted foreign concern and has outraged domestic groups in Brazil. However, it is a complex issue that is not easily solved.
Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon is a broad topic, involving a wide variety of actors, interests and causes. This paper will focus on cattle ranching as a cause and the range of actors involved in it, but it is important to note that cattle ranching is only one of several contributors to deforestation—mining, hydroelectric dams, road projects, military bases, lumbering and general industrialization are additional causes for concern—all of which would be impossible to address in one succinct paper.
Ranching in the Amazon became widely practiced due to government incentives in the 1970’s, a part of the government’s move to colonize the rainforest in order to industrialize Brazil. Unfortunately, rainforest soil proved to be useless after only a few years, forcing ranchers to clear more land. Not only did this cause environmental destruction, but it devastated the livelihood of indigenous peoples and rubber tappers who lived on the land that the government had so eagerly sold to ranchers. This led to violent conflicts between ranchers and the inhabitants of the forest, playing out an already prevalent hegemonic social system. Thus, rainforest destruction and social justice were linked from the very beginning. In the1980’s, the international community, particularly in the United States became concerned for the fate of the Amazon. NGO activity stimulated public protest and pressured institutions like the United States government and the World Bank to change policy towards Brazil in order to change Brazilian domestic environmental policy. Prior to international involvement in the Brazilian Amazon, Brazilian NGO’s had been active on the subject of deforestation for some time, but international support gave them new leverage. In the 1980’s Brazil found itself in the middle of a conflict involving an eclectic collection of actors, including the Brazilian government, foreign governments, the World Bank, ranchers, rubber tappers, indigenous peoples, foreign and domestic NGO’s, and the Catholic Church. According to Andrew Hurell, “Brazil is the single most important actor in the international politics of the [sic] deforestation.”
Given the many aspects of the conflict over Brazilian deforestation, it can be addressed from several different angles, which often leads to the neglect of certain actors.
It is also difficult to separate these actors’ contributions from one another, since they are often so closely linked. In order to avoid the omission of significant actors and to also maintain their separate roles, this paper will approach influential actors in the conflict over Amazonian deforestation in Brazil through three categories: the international community, Brazilian domestic groups, and institutions.
Actors in International Society: NGO’s, the media and the general public
International involvement in the Brazilian Amazon began with a broad campaign against environmentally harmful development projects that are funded my multilateral banks. American NGO’s were the driving force behind this campaign, and a few key World Bank projects became symbols for the movement. One such project was Polonoroeste in the state of Rodonia in Brazil, which funded a road that cut straight through untouched rainforest. As international NGO’s focused on Polonoroeste, protest against deforestation of the Amazon evolved into another movement entirely. The cause gained momentum as it acquired popular support.
To a very significant extent deforestation became an actual, as opposed to potential issue because pressure groups and NGOs succeeded in convincing governments and public opinion both of the global impact of deforetstaion and of the willingness or inability of the Brazilian government to take effective steps to address the problem.
No one seems to dispute that the international community played a crucial role in bringing about change in environmental policy in both international institutions and the Brazilian government, although some authors do give it less credit than it deserves.
Ken Conca is one of the most prominent academic figures in the rainforest debate and his approach is often used as a reference point by other authors on the topic. According to Conca, pressure from the international community significantly impacted World Bank lending policies and the government policies towards Brazil. He argues that, “The most effective catalyst for international concern…was not specific to Brazil or tropical forests but emerged instead from a more general campaign against ecologically harmful development projects.” Conca writes that through the campaign, the international community became more aware of local opposition to deforestation, presenting the opportunity to collaborate, and all action thereafter was rooted in the MBD campaign.
Conca presents the MDB campaign as the nucleus of international involvement, but Keck and Sikkink see it merely as the first step towards the more important role of a transnational advocacy network. They argue that the reason foreign NGO’s were so successful in the Brazilian Amazon is that they formed transnational advocacy networks that effectively established ties between them and domestic groups in Brazil, particularly with indigenous peoples and rubber tappers. Through these connections NGO’s were able to put a human face on environmental destruction, which made the campaign more appealing to the general public. “Their advocacy went well beyond the traditional conservation agenda; increasingly, defenders of nature had to come to terms with the need to defend also the rights of people.” Transnational advocacy networks essentially politicized what was originally a scientific debate led by the epistemic community, which led to the international public’s greater awareness and involvement in the Brazilian Amazon. Goodman and Hall also give the most credit to the international community and write that international NGOs “constituted perhaps the single most important force, both directly and indirectly, for bringing about the re-examination of major environmental questions relating to Amazonia.” Keck and Sikkink also argue that inclusion of marginalized Brazilian groups in the international movement exposed the fallacy behind the Brazilian government’s claim that it had to help its citizens get out of poverty before it could devote attention to conserving the environment. Clearly deforestation was exacerbating poverty in certain communities.
Like Keck and Sikkink and Goodmans and Hall, Andrew Hurell, a British international relations theorist, believes that action taken by the international community was the most significant factor in the movement to end deforestation and that the most significant factor within this movement was the alliance between foreign NGO’s and victims of deforestation, such as the National Council of Rubber Tappers. Hurell explains that the Amazon became such an appealing cause to international society through the drama and visibility of the process itself with pictures of huge palls of smoke, of bulldozers at work, of vast areas of jungle begin flooded; by the existence of seemingly clear villains (military governments, multinational companies, international banks), by the tragic plight of the victims (above all Indians, but also the rural poor), and by the emergence of martyrs and folk heroes.
This is similar to Keck and Sikkink’s argument that activists were able put opposition to deforestation in social justice terms, but Hurell expands on this by including the role of the media in this portrayal. He also argues that the international concern that was triggered by transnational alliances and the media gave new legitimacy to the previously ignored epistemic community.
Hurell convincingly makes the case that the international community was the largest influence in the movement to end Amazonian deforestation, however, he also points out the flaws in the international community’s approach. “External pressure” (as he calls it) cannot fully resolve the unequal distribution of power between developed and industrialized countries and it also tends to ignore and detract attention from other important issues of environmental degradation in Brazil. Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn also have reservations in regards to international involvement in the Amazon; they claim that global concern for the rainforest is a fad, and like Hurell, that the movement ignores more subtle aspects of deforestation. “There are stories about the slums, deforestation, and decimation of native populations, but none about the class structure that permits capital flight…or about the state and business elites that probably recycle more than half of all the aid received into North American and European banks.” International society brought global attention to Amazonian deforestation, but only to specific aspects of it –such as the rubber tappers, causing other areas to be ignored.
Actors in Brazil: native peoples, rubber tappers, NGOs and the Catholic Church
The Brazilian environmental movement began to pick up in the 1970’s. In 1971, Jose Lutzenberger, a prominent environmentalist, founded the first Brazilian environmental NGO. In 1972, Brazil’s stance at Stockholm, that essentially claimed that Brazil could not afford to worry about the environment until it had industrialized enough to support its population, generated much criticism at home triggering more domestic environmental activism. Apart from these politically oriented NGOs, a distinct subgroup of the Brazilian environmental movement concerned with social justice began to organize, particularly in the case of indigenous groups and rubber tappers. It is the social justice causes that international society has latched onto. The Amazon is host to a multitude of indigenous tribes, but since the rubber boom during World War II it has also hosted rubber tappers. Known as seringueros in Portuguese, rubber tappers were once virtually enslaved by debt peonage to estate owners and rubber barons. As estate owners left for the prospering cities in the 1960’s, rubber tappers still only barely eked out a living. Ranchers began invading and destroying the forests in the 1970’s, generating conflict between themselves and forest people—violence often left many dead on both sides. During this time, a key figure emerged from the rubber tapper community: Chico Mendes. With support from domestic groups like the Catholic Church, Mendes organized the rubber tappers into a union and became politically active. Mendes also became a key figure in the international movement in the 1980’s by working with foreign NGOs, and he quickly became incredibly symbolic in the global environmental movement. In 1988, Mendes was murdered, sparking an international uproar and stimulating change in Brazilian policy. While Mendes is not the only important leader in the Brazilian environmental movement, he is definitely the most well known and is often central to discussions on Amazonian deforestation.
Keck and Sikkink address domestic groups as the other end of the transnational advocacy network initiated by foreign groups. Because the network mainly involved indigenous peoples and rubber tappers, that is what the authors focus on. Their approach is not in terms of what groups were significant within Brazil, but what Brazilian groups were significant internationally in the movement against deforestation. They also explain that domestic groups took advantage of international attention as leverage for their goals. Thus, domestic pressure might bring about change, but partly because it was supported by foreign actors. Keck and Sikkink emphasize Chico Mendes’ role, explaining that he pushed for the formation of “extractive reserves” where rubber tappers could live and would use sustainable development, thus protecting the forest and the people.
Like Keck and Sikkink, Hecht and Cockburn approach Amazon defense mainly in terms of forest inhabitants and not other domestic groups (like environmental NGOs), but unlike Keck and Sikkink who address indigenous people and rubber tappers in relation to the international community, Hecht and Cockburn address the international community in relation to forest peoples—to them, the central actors in the issue. They write condescendingly, “A major leap in how North Americans viewed conservation occurred when it began to gradually dawn on conservationists that people and forests could actually coexist.” Hecht and Cockburn argue that the rubber tappers’ empates—resistance methods to ranchers, saved some 3 million acres of rainforest and significantly slowed deforestation, while indigenous groups became skilled in lobbying the government. The church assisted in these movements, but mainly through time consuming legal channels. To Hecht and Cockburn, Chico Mendes was a critical actor in the fight against deforestation, and the international community simply publicized his brilliance.
In her own work (that is not co-authored with Sikkink), Keck explores the specific case of the rubber tappers and does any excellent job of realistically evaluating their role in the movement. She believes that international society did more than publicize Mendes, but deliberately shaped his image. She argues that foreign actors convinced Mendes to shift the focus of his movement from unionizing to the environment in order to appeal to the international public, thus “the environment became a lens through which long-standing social conflicts took on a new meaning.” She also explains that Mendes’ role as an ecomartyr after his death rallied unlikely groups together. Keck argues that the alliance between rubber tappers and foreign groups explains the international attention Amazonian deforestation received, but the reason it became such a symbolic issue was the emergence of poor people as protagonists and leaders, which was an appealing shift in perspective for Northerners. Keck warns, however, that while the rubber tappers played a significant role in the cause by becoming international symbols, the success of the rubber tappers is often idealized.
The role of the Brazilian Catholic Church is addressed specifically by W.E. Hewitt, a sociology professor at the University of Western Ontario. Hewitt explains that the Church has been extremely outspoken against deforestation, it is not because of its concern for the environment but because of the marginalized groups that depend on it for their livelihood. According to Hewitt, the church is not against the environment, but it’s priority is clearly the needs of people, officially known as the Church’s “preferential option of the poor.” W.E. Hewitt argues that international environmental groups have viewed environmental destruction of the Amazon as a long-term issue of survival, “with at best a very narrowly envisaged conception of how to deal with the problem of social need in the here and now—especially that existing beyond specific communities such as native people.” Thus the Catholic Church, as a domestic group, has advocated for the inhabitants of the Amazon on a level that the international community has not. However, it is Hewitt’s hope that in time, the Church will care more about the environmental problems behind deforestation, not just the social ones.
Nira Broner Worcman gives political domestic groups more credit than previously mentioned authors, and in fact hardly addresses the role of forest peoples, with the exception of a general reference to Mendes. Worcman explains that contrary to the general view in Northern countries, Brazilian groups have been very involved in advocating for the forest since the 1970’s. She focuses specifically on the environmental activists Jose Lutzenberger and Fabio Feldman. The Brazilian media also publicized the cause, including an environmentally oriented soap opera. Worcman acknowledges that many people think the Brazilian environmental movement has been ineffective, but that it has actually been a visible and important actor in the movement against deforestation.
British sociologist Keith Bakx interestingly attributes all the environmental policy change in Brazil to domestic NGOs and political forces, and though he writes of the significance of the organization of rubber tappers, he never mentions Mendes. This omission of Mendes may be because of his involvement with foreign groups. So while Worcman feels the need to defend the Brazilian environmental movement, to Bakx it is not worth debating, it is simply a given that Brazilian environmental groups are solely responsible for rainforest conservation in Brazil. While Bakx acknowledges the significance of extractive reserves as a possible solution to Amazonian destruction, he remains skeptical that they would continue to succeed.
Hurell is less idealistic about the power of Brazilian actors to facilitate change than Worcman and Bakx. Hurell writes that the Brazilian environmental movement came out of three sources: the conservation movement—which advocated for the formation of national parks, urban grass-roots organizations that wereoften rooted in the Church—and developed in response to poverty and inequality, and ecological groups that emerged in the 1970’s made up mostly of the middle-class. Hurell argues that while the movement has facilitated some change in Brazil, there are three reasons why it has not been as effective as some would like to believe: First, because the movement grew out of many local concerns, it has had a difficult time creating a cohesive ideology that unites all the smaller groups. Second, there has been a division between middle-class groups and the urban poor. Third, the influence of Brazilian environmental groups on political parties has been limited. He seems to make a distinction between members of the environmental movement and victims of deforestation and point out that alliances between victims and international society have been extremely effective.
Institutional Actors: foreign and domestic governments and the World Bank
When push comes to shove, it is the institutions that make the final decisions on environmental policy, which is why the international community and Brazilian environmental movement have put so much energy into pressuring institutions to act. While the United Nations has been a forum for the issue of Amazonian deforestation, the Brazilian government, the United States government and the World Bank have been the three pivotal institutional actors in the conflict of Amazonian deforestation. In the 1970’s, Brazil began a huge push for industrialization with the encouragement of the United States and World Bank. Traditionally the Brazilian government has seen the Amazon as a commodity, and as the industrial push came, the Amazon was viewed as the country’s ticket to development. Any protest against this policy was easily squelched since Brazil was under military rule until 1985. The MDB campaign that began in 1983 put pressure on United States Congress to change its policies towards World Bank loans, this is significant since the United States is often the principle donor. After a Congressional inquiry, $256 million was pulled out from a $434 million World Bank loan to Brazil, while pressure was simultaneously being directly put on the World Bank by the international community. The Brazilian government’s initial response was that the industrialized world was attempting to violate state sovereignty and essentially instate “environmental colonialism.” However, as pressure increased both internally and externally and new Brazilian politicians entered office, the situation began to shift. In 1988, president José Sarney instituted the Nossa Naturaleza (“Our Nature”) program, which attempted to placate some international complaints about environmental destruction. President Sarney’s successor, Fernando Collor de Mello, took further steps to preserve the environment and halt deforestation.
While Keck’s main focus is on the international community and rubber tappers, she also explains the involvement of some institutional groups. According to Keck, under pressure form American NGO’s, a series of Congressional hearings were held and as a result several Congressmen asked the treasury department to reassess the environmental impact of American loans. As a result of this action, the United States convinced the World Bank to suspend the loan to the Polonoroeste project in 1985, citing Brazilian violations of environmental and indigenous rights provisions. Goodman and Hall add that this was clearly a historic decision since it was the first time the World Bank had ever halted a loan for environmental reasons. Like Keck, Goodman and Hall argue that this was mainly due to American influence.
Hurell explains that the Brazilian government initially responded to international pressure to end deforestation with “environmental nationalism” which espoused the view that Brazil had a right to do whatever it wanted with its national resources and that interference on the part of industrialized countries and the World Bank was environmental imperialism. However, as pressure mounted internally and externally, the government’s approach to the Amazon shifted. Conca claims that this shift was partly due to the recent change in government in Brazil. As the head of the transition government from military rule to civilian, President Sarney was in a difficult position, stuck in the middle of powerful military interests and international pressure. Therefore it was difficult for Sarney to take decisive action against deforestation. However, President Collor realized that he could use environmental conservation as leverage to gain concessions in other international political arenas and also to improve Brazil’s image abroad. One of Collor’s most significant decisions concerning the environment was to unexpectedly appoint environmentalist José Lutzenberger as environmental secretary. Hurell reinforces Conca’s view that Collor was using the international environmental movement for political gain and writes, “The new policy [under Collor] was characterized by several dramatic gestures clearly intended to court international public opinion.”
Like Conca and Hurell, Worcman highlights the Nossa Naturaleza program that emerged under Sarney and Collor’s steps to halt deforestation. However, what Worcman focuses on are the Brazilian environmentalists who infiltrated the government to become politicians themselves, specifically José Lutzenberger and Fabio Feldmen—who had led a movement to sue dirty industry, was later elected to Congress and wrote a new section of the constitution that addressed the environment. According to Worcman, these two political figures became the environmental conscious of the Brazilian government and linked politics to domestic groups.
Ans Kolk a Dutch professor of business studies, argues that the turning point for the Brazilian government was the pivotal year of 1988. In 1988 the Brazilian National Space Research Institute released alarming new statistics on the rate of deforestation, it was an unusually warm summer in the North which coincided with newfound fear of global warming that had been linked to deforestation, and Chico Mendes was murdered, generating a sharp increase in international pressure. Sarney held true to his stubborn stance of “environmental nationalism” until 1989, when he announced the creation of Nossa Naturaleza, which Kolk claims was due to the events of 1988.
Kolk mainly addresses the role of the G-7 in the politics of Brazilian deofrestation. In 1990 the G-7 met at Houstan and created a Pilot Programme to Protect the Brazilian Amazon (PPB) that offered the Brazilian government an aid program that would be facilitated through the World Bank. This plan was launched in 1991 at the London meeting of the G-7, but with a much more cautious approach than had previously been assumed by international institutions in order not to offend Brazil and to avoid accusations of “internationalization.” Kolk argues that cooperation of the Brazilian government with the PPB and the shift in policy that had already begun in 1988 was crucial to the success of the PPB.
Despite the fact that the Brazilian government has changed its environmental policy significantly since the 1970’s, there is skepticism as to whether or not the policy will be enforced. In Mac Margolis’ 1998 article—one of the few more current pieces of literature—he writes that the 1990’s were years of “political slumber” in which deforestation continued, a fraction of the promised money PPB materialized and officials were not given enough support fiscally or physically to enforce laws against deforestation. Thus, while institutional actors have at least acknowledged the gravity of Amazonian deforestation, their attempts to remedy it may not have been effective as hoped.
Conclusion:
A broad range of literature exists on the topic of Amazonian deforestation in Brazil, however it is still lacking in some areas. There seems to be much research on deforestation in relation to politics and social justice, but little on economics. It is time experts from all three of these areas, including those from the epistemic community collaborate to formulate a greater understanding of the cause and possible solutions of deforestation.
Much political progress has been made internationally in Brazil that attempts to halt deforestation, however, even if institutions are willing to make the shift, they may be incapable or unwilling to comply with new environmental policy. Despite many new policies in Brazil, deforestation continues at a rapid rate, often illegally. Clearly, political progress is not always environmentally effective in Brazil, and perhaps new possibilities should be explored, such as the rubber tappers’ form of resistance called empates, and other less conventional techniques.
Where literature is most lacking, though, is in current publications. Publications beyond the early 1990’s are rare, and most are from the late 1980’s. This gives a lopsided perspective on the situation in Brazil, it seems that Amazonian deforestation was not only a fad among activists, but scholars as well. More current research must be done on the rate of deforestation in the Amazon, the situation of forest peoples, new institutional policy and the effectiveness of both old and new policy. Until then, an understanding of the actors involved in the conflict over Amazonian deforestation in Brazil, and the conflict itself, will be not be up to date and effective action will be difficult to implement.
Philip M. Fearnside. “Environmental Destruction in the Brazilian Amazon.” In The Future of Amazonia: destruction or sustainable development? Eds. David Goodman and Anthony Hall. (New York: St Martin’s Press,1990).
Fearnside, 192-211.
Andrew Hurell. “Brazil and the International Politics of Amazonian Deforestation.” In The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions. Eds. Andrew Hurell and Benedict Kingsbury. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 400.
Ken Conca. “Environmental Protection, International Norms, and State Sovereignty: The Case of the Brazilian Amazon.” In Beyond Westphalia. Eds. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,1995). 161.
Hurell (“Brazil….”), 402
Conca,160.
Ibid, 161-162.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
Ibid, 126
David Goodman and Anthony Hall. “Introduction” in The Future of Amazonia: destruction or sustainable development? Eds. David Goodman and Anthony Hall (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990).
Andrew Hurell. “The Politics of Amazonian Deforestation.” Journal ofLatin
American Studies. 23(1991) n1: 197-215.
Ibid, 420-421.
Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn. The Fate of the Forest: developers, destroyers and defenders of the Amazon. (New York: Verso, 1989). 197.
Worcman, Nira Broner. “Brazil’s Thriving Environmental Movement.” Technology Review. 93 (1990) n7: 2.
Keith Bakx. “The Shanty Town, Final Stage of Rural Development? The Case of Acre.” In The Future of Amazonia: destruction or sustainable development? Eds. David Goodman and Anthony Hall (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990). 50-52.
Margaret E. Keck.“Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: lessons from
the rubber tappers of Acre.” Comparative Politics. 27(1995) n4: 412.
Ibid, 414-415.
Keck and Sikkink, 141.
Ibid, 141-142.
Hecht and Cockburn, 182.
Ibid, 169-174.
Ibid 182-186.
Ibid, 411.
Keck, 417.
W.E. Hewitt.“ The Roman Catholic Church and Environmental Politics in Brazil.” The Journal of Developing Areas. 26 (1992): 246.
Ibid, 245.
Hewitt, 256
Worcman,1-6.
Bakx, 49-69.
Bakx, 68.
Hurell (Brazil…), 412-414.
Conca, 163-164.
Goodman and Hall, 14-15.
Conca, 163-164.
Keck, 415.
Goodman and Hall, 14-15.
Hurell (Brazil…), 403-409.
Conca, 163-165.
Hurell (Brazil…), 409.
Worcman, 1 and 3.
Kolk, A. 1999. “The complexities of the environmental regulation: the example of the Brazilian Rainforest.” International Journal of Environmental Pollution. 11(1): 71-72.
Ibid, 73-74.
Ibid, 77.
Mac Margolis, “The Assault Continues.” International Wildlife. 28(1998) n6: 42-51.
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