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Home Identity Construction Political Economy Orientalism Language Borders Religion Annotated Bibliography	back to identity Paper for History of South Africa, Fall 2003 The British-Afrikaner Power Struggle: The Advent of Apartheid Hollywood action movies always make an obvious distinction between good and bad guys so audiences clearly know who to rally behind. Throughout history, however, the good guy/ bad guy dichotomy has often proven too simplistic, as demonstrated by the urge to blame Afrikaners for Apartheid in South Africa. Blaming the Afrikaner National Party responsible for establishing the Apartheid laws for the resulting destruction in African lives would only tell half of the story. Although Afrikaner beliefs constituted the ideas behind Apartheid, those beliefs were incorporated in legislation because of the power struggle between the Afrikaners and British. The competition for national supremacy between the Afrikaners and British led to a situation where Apartheid laws were accepted. At the turn of the century, imperialism, led by the strong Western powers, swept the world. A “scramble” for Africa ensued, with Germany in particular closing in on British South Africa, annexing nearby Namibia, Togoland, Cameroon, and Tanganyika . The relatively recent discovery in the Transvaal of the greatest resource of gold in the world created a strong incentive for other countries to steal the land from Britain. Germany’s diplomatic support for the Transvaal undermined British rule, which in turn strengthened the British fear of losing colonial foothold in South Africa. Imperial nations competing for power capitalized on British anxiety over South Africa to gain colonies. The imperialist vista began drifting to the Far East, beyond South Africa. By threatening Britain’s claim on South Africa, competing nations theorized that Britain would offer diplomatic concessions in the East out of defense . Britain felt its empire diminishing as other nations driven by imperialism threatened British hegemony. From the outside, British fear of encroachment borders on the ridiculous, as it still held a high percentage of land throughout the colonized world. Yet compared to the growing industrial power of other Western nations, Britain was in fact faltering. The prospect of South African independence posed an unsurpassed threat to British supremacy throughout the world. If other British colonies saw South Africa rise in power, the British might continue to lose colonial control as other Western empires grew. By maintaining control over South Africa the British Empire ensured its prestige among international powers. The growing Afrikaner power over the gold mining area of the Transvaal directly threatened British supremacy over South Africa. After granting the Transvaal self-government in 1881, Britain no longer directly benefited from the rising gold mining industry. Disconnected from the prosperity rising in the Transvaal, many English-speaking South Africans moved to the Transvaal and to directly involve themselves in the mining industry. Nevertheless, those British who assumed they would find great wealth and respect in the Transvaal soon learned otherwise. These Uitlanders (or “foreigner” in Afrikaans) found themselves disenfranchised and disregarded by the Afrikaner government. The gold-mining Uitlanders resented the Afrikaner government’s policies that favored Afrikaner farmers over urban entrepreneurship. Lacking the franchise, the Uitlanders were denied a voice with which to stand up for their interests. In London, Lord Chamberlain, of the Colonial office, brought the Uitlander’s request for the franchise to the Cabinet in April 1899. Responding to the problem in the Transvaal, Chamberlain sent the staunch Imperialist British High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner to negotiate with Transvaal President Paul Kruger. When Kruger offered a five-year franchise with a British promise of non-intervention, Milner and Chamberlain voiced their opposition. Chamberlain’s offensive comments toward the Afrikaner President following the negotiation prompted Kruger to increase the offer to a seven-year franchise and international arbitration. Kruger’s pressure on the British government sparked retaliation in London, where officials began plotting a course of action. Meanwhile, in South Africa, Prime Minister Cecil Rhodes plotted his own method to maintain British hegemony. Rhodes planned to incite a rebellion by exploiting Uitlander discontent in hopes of annexing of the Transvaal under his leadership. Facilitated by Chamberlain, a reform committee would mobilize the Uitlanders in a rebellion in Johannesburg, then proclaim a provisional government. Though the Uitlanders chose to postpone the raid, the leader of the rebellion, Star Jameson, composed a fake appeal from the Uitlanders, pushing his troops ahead in December 1895. Afrikaner forces easily suppressed the motley crew. The failed Jameson rebellion diminished respect for British officers involved, but also invoked strong Afrikaner sympathy. As Rhodes resigned as Prime Minister, Kruger’s strengthened power contributed to his overwhelming presidential victory in 1898. Kruger built up his forces to ensure Afrikaner domination in a politically volatile region. He imported masses of weapons to protect Afrikaners from further British hostility. Kruger curtailed Uitlander political activities to ensure impenetrability by the British, while strengthening Afrikaner power through an alliance with the Orange Free State. If the British government began sharpening their swords over the question of the franchise, resentment only mounted upon Kruger’s insults to British hegemony. In the wake of Kruger’s rising Afrikaner power and the continued franchise debate, Chamberlain implored the British government to implement direct action in the Transvaal. In a cabinet meeting on September 8, 1899, Chamberlain asked the cabinet to consider an ultimatum, forcing Kruger to comply or face war. Comprehending the severity of the consequences of losing the Transvaal, Parliament agreed. The ultimatum comprised a one-year franchise to lower mining costs by allowing more cheap black labor, agreeing to reduce arms, and accepting a new convention entailing British superiority. In a minor addendum, the ultimatum also asked for a fair deal for the Africans, though no one specified what exactly this vague language entailed. Before hearing a response from Kruger, British Parliament sent 10,000 troops to Natal either to call Kruger’s bluff and bring him back to the conference table or to begin war. After a British newspaper article reported the deployment of 47,000 men to invade the Transvaal, Kruger responded to the British ultimatum with one of his own. This ultimatum called for British acceptance of Afrikaner policy on differing points such as Uitlander enfranchisement, treatment of the African population, and diminished British roles in the Transvaal government. Kruger’s ultimatum also involved the withdrawal of all troops from borders, a recall of the 47,000 reinforcement troops, and a promise to abstain from sending more troops. Kruger’s expectation of British compliance within forty-eight hours made the prospect of war a reality. The Afrikaners declared war and began attacks across the frontier on October 12, 1899. The conservative British government believed its easy victory in this war would ensure British rule over South Africa, thus upholding a vital link in its empire. Liberal opposition accounted for the little internal resistance voiced under the conservative government. As the Afrikaners faced the powerful British alone, surrounded by the British colonies with no access outside of the country to replenish arms, the British saw the ensuing war as a “war at teatime”. Every aspect of this war against the Afrikaners contributed to the British expectation of an easy and fast victory. As seen earlier in the Jameson Raid, the British severely misjudged the force of Afrikaner resistance. While the British blundered along the veld, the Afrikaners demonstrated advanced tactical mobility, resulting in 7000 British casualties. Soon enough the Afrikaners, with no access outside of South Africa to replenish arms began falling behind. As a last resort, Afrikaner forces resorted to guerrilla warfare. On December 3, 1990, Afrikaners Jan Smuts and General De LaRey led their forces under the dark of the night to trap a British camp of 12,000 under General Clements. This attack dramatically changed the face of the war to one composed of Afrikaner guerilla warfare and harsh British response. In March 1901 the British employed the policy of collective punishment, sparing no mercy on any “uncivilized Afrikaner savages” as Kitchener called them. British forces destroyed forty towns by employing the scorched earth method, stripping the land of all its cattle, as well as women, children, and the displaced blacks employed by Afrikaner farmers. The British destroyed or removed anything and everything that could sustain the Boer guerilla fighters, including women and children who could possibly be providing help to the guerilla fighters. These prisoners were taken to concentration camps, or “camps of refuge” where somewhere between 18,000 and 26,000 of them died. The conditions in these concentration camps basically provided a death sentence for the Afrikaner women and children. Women whose husbands were still fighting against the British were fed rations including _ pounds of mealie-meal, rice, or potatoes, one pound of meat twice weekly, one ounce of coffee daily, and _ ounces of salt daily. This poor diet led to rapid spread of disease already prevalent in the high concentrations of people in unsanitary conditions. The shortage of medical supplies and staff resulted in the deaths of many inhabitants. In an attempt to bring a swift end to the war, Lord Kitchener applied a blockhouse maneuver, with Africans suffering the brunt of the violence. Barbed-wire fence lines with concrete blockhouses guarded by 5000 Africans ensured that the British lost no ground. Though this took a toll on the African population, this method produced the swift end Kitchener had hoped for. By the end of the Boer War Afrikaners began uniting, though previously Afrikaner hostility and nationalism was less prevalent. Before 1902 most Afrikaners identified themselves as “Cape Dutch, Free Staters, Transvaalers” rather than as a collective identity. Sometime before 1914, a new identification emerged as “a unique people, Afrikaners, united by a common history and language”. The British scorched earth war tactic and concentration camps undoubtedly triggered this new Afrikaner solidarity. After the war’s end, the British government fostered further resentment by reneging on its promise to help reconstruct the country. While the British government funded rejuvenation projects for gold-mining in Johannesburg, they left the ruined agricultural system to rot. By neglecting Afrikaner needs and humiliating them during the war, the British government played a pivotal role in fostering a growing Afrikaner nationalism. Since the Dutch settled South Africa in the 16th century, seeds of this rising Afrikaner nationalism after the Boer War were planted. Afrikaners always believed that God sent them to land inhabited by African “heathens.” The Afrikaner mythology claimed that through a Covenant with God, they were destined to rule over all of South Africa. Afrikaners believed their subjugation by the British mirrored the enslavement of Israel in the Bible. Offering an explanation for their humiliating defeat, this mythology simultaneously presented a hope for emerging from the ravages of British oppression. Just as God led Israel out of suffering, He would also lead Afrikaners to political power over South Africa. Within the Afrikaner Nationalist movement, the Dopper community developed the myth of Apartheid. The Dopper Community incorporated racist theories into Afrikaner mythology such as viewing Africans as heathens unable to govern themselves. Afrikaner solidarity and mythologies emerged as a result of their destruction at Britain’s hands during and following the war. After the British claimed victory, liberal British realized the horror accompanying the defeat of the Afrikaners. Sparked by an international as well as a national outcry, the British government sent the Ladies Commission led by Emily Hobhouse, a 41 year old English spinster, to tour the concentration camps. She found death camps lacking the basic necessities of food, clean water, and protection from sun and cold. Lloyd George, a Liberal politician accused the government of using a “policy of extermination” in the camps. Emily Hobhouse commented, “it will always be remembered that this is the way British rule started here.” Hobhouse’s fifteen page report to the Committee of the Distress Fund reached Britain during a time of shifting sentiment as the liberals were taking power. This new group of English leaders, ashamed to be associated with such human destruction, realized the international respect they would lose in such an affiliation. By employing such destructive measures to gain victory, the British lost any moral ascendancy over the Afrikaners whose mythology strengthened their solidarity. Entering the peace talks mindful of Afrikaner resentment and hoping not to ostracize them further, for fear of Afrikaner retaliation, the British had little clout in negotiations. While Britain demanded enfranchisement for all white South Africans in the Transvaal, it granted the Afrikaner states a relatively large degree of autonomy. Britain granted the states self-government in hopes that its influence through British immigration and Anglicization would peacefully bring British control. The concession the British made with the greatest impact on the African population considered their enfranchisement. The Peace Treaty of Veerniging, signed on May 31, 1902, resolved that the question of African enfranchisement would be addressed after the introduction of self-government. The British knew this stipulation would never be addressed when the Afrikaners were in office, but would rather create a life for the Africans much like that before the war. Though the British had little access to the political arena, they attempted to influence the social arena of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Anglicization became a major method used to wipe out the Dutch influence and foster a new generation of pro-British. State schools’ teachers instructed in English and promoted British rule in their classrooms. The new British system gave Afrikaner parents the impression that the British were removing all traces of Dutch heritage. Nevertheless, the Afrikaners proved difficult to penetrate through educational systems as most Afrikaner parents placed little value in education. Many families believed that one year of school proved sufficient, giving the teachers barely any time to develop British sympathizers. Private schools were set up with Dutch and Afrikaans as the language of instruction for those Afrikaners who believed in the necessity of education. By attempting to foster an acceptance of British rule, the policy of Anglicization only increased Afrikaner Nationalism. While the British tried to penetrate Afrikaner society, they also relied on a ‘land scheme’ involving British immigration to increase the amount of pro-British voters. The theory behind granting self-government in the Peace of Veerniging relied on substantial British immigration to peacefully gain control of the Transvaal. The British government advertised the prosperous gold mining industry hoping to incite immigration, but took no further actions to ensure a political victory. However, the plan backfired since British immigration failed to produce numbers constituting a majority. Even among the Uitlander population in the Transvaal, the Afrikaner party Het Volk capitalized on divisions over pro-Boer versus Imperialists. The Jameson Raid remained in everyone’s memories. Jameson’s inconsideration of the Uitlanders’ sentiments leading up to the rebellion gave English-speaking Transvaalers the impression that the British officials disregarded their opinions. The Uitlander population remained a minority of voters, but even among those living in the Transvaal, only a fraction voted in favor of the British. Reliance on the land scheme resulted in the clear victory of the Afrikaner party Het Volk in 1907 with General Louis Botha becoming Prime Minister. After winning the election, Afrikaner power continued to rise. Fearing growing Afrikaner supremacy, the British government raised the idea of unification among the four colonies. British official Lionel Curtis initiated the establishment of a union by authoring the Selbourne Memorandum in January 1907. Unification offered incentives to both groups of the white population. Ronald Hyam maintains that the Afrikaners saw unification as enabling them to “assert themselves against the magnates, be rid of British interference, and to create a firm base for Afrikaner national expansion.” By unifying with the English-speaking South Africans the Afrikaners hoped to take back South Africa as promised in their mythology. Many English-speaking South Africans also wished to break away from their mother country. These South Africans felt that Britain did not always consider the South Africans, demonstrated by the Jameson Raid, so they had no incentive to support Britain. Both white populations decided such a move would prove beneficial, but what about the African population composing a drastic majority of the country? The African Native Congress recounts the main objectives in formation of the Union for the white population to “consolidate their control over the land to the exclusion of the black majority”. The Peace of Veerniging eliminated the possibility of African enfranchisement in 1902, and nothing had changed since. Britain once again feared they might alienate the Afrikaners by demanding the franchise for Africans. British officials could justify their silence by referring to the American South where the government enfranchised Blacks against the opinion of many Whites. White Americans still treated Blacks abhorrently as racial violence and segregation remained rampant despite Black enfranchisement. Ronald Hyamin defends British silence in defending Africans by noting Britain’s good, though misguided, intentions for the Africans. The British Liberals did not consider enfranchisement sufficient for the needs of the Africans. Rather, they believed Africans would benefit more from “development of native institutions on native lines under Paternalistic guidance.” Regardless of the justifications the British presented, Britain’s irresponsibility allowed a new era of African opression once the Union took control. The first election under the Union of South Africa in May 1910 proved the British Liberals’ disillusionment in hoping for a victory. The Afrikaner South African Party defeated the English Progressive Party, electing General Louis Botha as Prime Minister. Botha appointed Jan Smuts as Minister of Interior, Mines, and Defense, and General J.B.M. Hertzog as Minister of Justice. The relationship between these three officials indicated tension from the start. Hertzog believed that Smuts and Botha sacrificed Afrikaner interest in sympathizing with British interests. Botha and Smuts found Hertzog’s rabble-rousing complaints creating unnecessary divisions among the Afrikaners. The tension mounted until Hertzog resigned in 1912. In the aftermath of Hertzog’s resignation, he formed the National Party influenced by the myth of Apartheid. Espousing strong Afrikaner ideals, the National Party won the 1914 election, creating a new dimension to the African’s role in South Africa. Strict policy regarding Africans emerged under the National Party influenced by the Myth of Apartheid. One of the first policies in the dawn of Apartheid materialized regarding African residency. Out of 4,500,000 black people throughout the country, 1.75 million resided in locations reserved for Africans, around _ million lived in municipalities or in urban areas, around one million squatted on European farms, and the rest were employed in public or private service jobs. On June 14, 1913 however, those one million squatters lost their homes with the passage of the Native’s Land Act. This bill stipulated that no African could purchase land, nor that a white person could purchase land in the scheduled areas for Africans. By disqualifying whites from purchasing land, the Afrikaner government ensured that British concern for African interests would remain low. In truth, no white person, or any person in general, would ever want to live in the horrendous conditions in the scheduled areas. The African population, the group directly affected by the Native’s Land Act, had no voice to protest it under the Union constitution. Although few people in the government listened to their concerns, Africans remained alert to the status of the Bill. They pleaded for the rejection of this bill, but to no avail. Without the protection of the franchise guaranteeing a degree of civil rights, the lives of the Africans were completely in the hands of the white government. In the late 1800s when the Uitlanders found themselves disenfranchised, like the Africans following unification, they relied on British support to take control of the Transvaal. With the heightened British fear of losing their empire, protecting British supremacy within South Africa ensured their power in the international community. Unwilling to accept British rule, the Afrikaners resisted through continual struggle to take and maintain control. Beginning as a power struggle between the white groups, the resulting political situation offered the setting for legislation taking away African rights. Although the theories behind Apartheid were born in the Afrikaner mythology, blaming only the Afrikaners for the tragic system completely overlooks Britain’s role in creating an atmosphere receptive to Apartheid. Although racism always ruled South African relationships between the indigenous and colonizing populations, Apartheid became possible as an outcome of bickering over control. By maintaining their empire, the British inadvertently sacrificed the Africans’ control over their lives for 80 years. back to top Bibliography 1. Sacks, Benjamin. South Africa : An Imperial Dilemma, Non-Europeans and the British Nation, 1902-1914. New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press, 1967. 2. “The Role of Black People in the War.” http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/black.html 22 Nov. 2003. 3. Thompson, Leonard. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
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Paper for History of South Africa, Fall 2003

The British-Afrikaner Power Struggle:
The Advent of Apartheid

Hollywood action movies always make an obvious distinction between good and bad guys so audiences clearly know who to rally behind. Throughout history, however, the good guy/ bad guy dichotomy has often proven too simplistic, as demonstrated by the urge to blame Afrikaners for Apartheid in South Africa. Blaming the Afrikaner National Party responsible for establishing the Apartheid laws for the resulting destruction in African lives would only tell half of the story. Although Afrikaner beliefs constituted the ideas behind Apartheid, those beliefs were incorporated in legislation because of the power struggle between the Afrikaners and British. The competition for national supremacy between the Afrikaners and British led to a situation where Apartheid laws were accepted.

At the turn of the century, imperialism, led by the strong Western powers, swept the world. A “scramble” for Africa ensued, with Germany in particular closing in on British South Africa, annexing nearby Namibia, Togoland, Cameroon, and Tanganyika . The relatively recent discovery in the Transvaal of the greatest resource of gold in the world created a strong incentive for other countries to steal the land from Britain. Germany’s diplomatic support for the Transvaal undermined British rule, which in turn strengthened the British fear of losing colonial foothold in South Africa. Imperial nations competing for power capitalized on British anxiety over South Africa to gain colonies. The imperialist vista began drifting to the Far East, beyond South Africa. By threatening Britain’s claim on South Africa, competing nations theorized that Britain would offer diplomatic concessions in the East out of defense . Britain felt its empire diminishing as other nations driven by imperialism threatened British hegemony.

From the outside, British fear of encroachment borders on the ridiculous, as it still held a high percentage of land throughout the colonized world. Yet compared to the growing industrial power of other Western nations, Britain was in fact faltering. The prospect of South African independence posed an unsurpassed threat to British supremacy throughout the world. If other British colonies saw South Africa rise in power, the British might continue to lose colonial control as other Western empires grew. By maintaining control over South Africa the British Empire ensured its prestige among international powers.

The growing Afrikaner power over the gold mining area of the Transvaal directly threatened British supremacy over South Africa. After granting the Transvaal self-government in 1881, Britain no longer directly benefited from the rising gold mining industry. Disconnected from the prosperity rising in the Transvaal, many English-speaking South Africans moved to the Transvaal and to directly involve themselves in the mining industry. Nevertheless, those British who assumed they would find great wealth and respect in the Transvaal soon learned otherwise.

These Uitlanders (or “foreigner” in Afrikaans) found themselves disenfranchised and disregarded by the Afrikaner government. The gold-mining Uitlanders resented the Afrikaner government’s policies that favored Afrikaner farmers over urban entrepreneurship. Lacking the franchise, the Uitlanders were denied a voice with which to stand up for their interests. In London, Lord Chamberlain, of the Colonial office, brought the Uitlander’s request for the franchise to the Cabinet in April 1899. Responding to the problem in the Transvaal, Chamberlain sent the staunch Imperialist British High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner to negotiate with Transvaal President Paul Kruger. When Kruger offered a five-year franchise with a British promise of non-intervention, Milner and Chamberlain voiced their opposition. Chamberlain’s offensive comments toward the Afrikaner President following the negotiation prompted Kruger to increase the offer to a seven-year franchise and international arbitration. Kruger’s pressure on the British government sparked retaliation in London, where officials began plotting a course of action.

Meanwhile, in South Africa, Prime Minister Cecil Rhodes plotted his own method to maintain British hegemony. Rhodes planned to incite a rebellion by exploiting Uitlander discontent in hopes of annexing of the Transvaal under his leadership. Facilitated by Chamberlain, a reform committee would mobilize the Uitlanders in a rebellion in Johannesburg, then proclaim a provisional government. Though the Uitlanders chose to postpone the raid, the leader of the rebellion, Star Jameson, composed a fake appeal from the Uitlanders, pushing his troops ahead in December 1895. Afrikaner forces easily suppressed the motley crew.

The failed Jameson rebellion diminished respect for British officers involved, but also invoked strong Afrikaner sympathy. As Rhodes resigned as Prime Minister, Kruger’s strengthened power contributed to his overwhelming presidential victory in 1898. Kruger built up his forces to ensure Afrikaner domination in a politically volatile region. He imported masses of weapons to protect Afrikaners from further British hostility. Kruger curtailed Uitlander political activities to ensure impenetrability by the British, while strengthening Afrikaner power through an alliance with the Orange Free State. If the British government began sharpening their swords over the question of the franchise, resentment only mounted upon Kruger’s insults to British hegemony.

In the wake of Kruger’s rising Afrikaner power and the continued franchise debate, Chamberlain implored the British government to implement direct action in the Transvaal. In a cabinet meeting on September 8, 1899, Chamberlain asked the cabinet to consider an ultimatum, forcing Kruger to comply or face war. Comprehending the severity of the consequences of losing the Transvaal, Parliament agreed. The ultimatum comprised a one-year franchise to lower mining costs by allowing more cheap black labor, agreeing to reduce arms, and accepting a new convention entailing British superiority. In a minor addendum, the ultimatum also asked for a fair deal for the Africans, though no one specified what exactly this vague language entailed. Before hearing a response from Kruger, British Parliament sent 10,000 troops to Natal either to call Kruger’s bluff and bring him back to the conference table or to begin war.

After a British newspaper article reported the deployment of 47,000 men to invade the Transvaal, Kruger responded to the British ultimatum with one of his own. This ultimatum called for British acceptance of Afrikaner policy on differing points such as Uitlander enfranchisement, treatment of the African population, and diminished British roles in the Transvaal government. Kruger’s ultimatum also involved the withdrawal of all troops from borders, a recall of the 47,000 reinforcement troops, and a promise to abstain from sending more troops. Kruger’s expectation of British compliance within forty-eight hours made the prospect of war a reality. The Afrikaners declared war and began attacks across the frontier on October 12, 1899.
The conservative British government believed its easy victory in this war would ensure British rule over South Africa, thus upholding a vital link in its empire. Liberal opposition accounted for the little internal resistance voiced under the conservative government. As the Afrikaners faced the powerful British alone, surrounded by the British colonies with no access outside of the country to replenish arms, the British saw the ensuing war as a “war at teatime”. Every aspect of this war against the Afrikaners contributed to the British expectation of an easy and fast victory.

As seen earlier in the Jameson Raid, the British severely misjudged the force of Afrikaner resistance. While the British blundered along the veld, the Afrikaners demonstrated advanced tactical mobility, resulting in 7000 British casualties. Soon enough the Afrikaners, with no access outside of South Africa to replenish arms began falling behind. As a last resort, Afrikaner forces resorted to guerrilla warfare. On December 3, 1990, Afrikaners Jan Smuts and General De LaRey led their forces under the dark of the night to trap a British camp of 12,000 under General Clements. This attack dramatically changed the face of the war to one composed of Afrikaner guerilla warfare and harsh British response.

In March 1901 the British employed the policy of collective punishment, sparing no mercy on any “uncivilized Afrikaner savages” as Kitchener called them. British forces destroyed forty towns by employing the scorched earth method, stripping the land of all its cattle, as well as women, children, and the displaced blacks employed by Afrikaner farmers. The British destroyed or removed anything and everything that could sustain the Boer guerilla fighters, including women and children who could possibly be providing help to the guerilla fighters.

These prisoners were taken to concentration camps, or “camps of refuge” where somewhere between 18,000 and 26,000 of them died. The conditions in these concentration camps basically provided a death sentence for the Afrikaner women and children. Women whose husbands were still fighting against the British were fed rations including _ pounds of mealie-meal, rice, or potatoes, one pound of meat twice weekly, one ounce of coffee daily, and _ ounces of salt daily. This poor diet led to rapid spread of disease already prevalent in the high concentrations of people in unsanitary conditions. The shortage of medical supplies and staff resulted in the deaths of many inhabitants.

In an attempt to bring a swift end to the war, Lord Kitchener applied a blockhouse maneuver, with Africans suffering the brunt of the violence. Barbed-wire fence lines with concrete blockhouses guarded by 5000 Africans ensured that the British lost no ground. Though this took a toll on the African population, this method produced the swift end Kitchener had hoped for.

By the end of the Boer War Afrikaners began uniting, though previously Afrikaner hostility and nationalism was less prevalent. Before 1902 most Afrikaners identified themselves as “Cape Dutch, Free Staters, Transvaalers” rather than as a collective identity. Sometime before 1914, a new identification emerged as “a unique people, Afrikaners, united by a common history and language”. The British scorched earth war tactic and concentration camps undoubtedly triggered this new Afrikaner solidarity. After the war’s end, the British government fostered further resentment by reneging on its promise to help reconstruct the country. While the British government funded rejuvenation projects for gold-mining in Johannesburg, they left the ruined agricultural system to rot. By neglecting Afrikaner needs and humiliating them during the war, the British government played a pivotal role in fostering a growing Afrikaner nationalism.

Since the Dutch settled South Africa in the 16th century, seeds of this rising Afrikaner nationalism after the Boer War were planted. Afrikaners always believed that God sent them to land inhabited by African “heathens.” The Afrikaner mythology claimed that through a Covenant with God, they were destined to rule over all of South Africa. Afrikaners believed their subjugation by the British mirrored the enslavement of Israel in the Bible. Offering an explanation for their humiliating defeat, this mythology simultaneously presented a hope for emerging from the ravages of British oppression. Just as God led Israel out of suffering, He would also lead Afrikaners to political power over South Africa. Within the Afrikaner Nationalist movement, the Dopper community developed the myth of Apartheid. The Dopper Community incorporated racist theories into Afrikaner mythology such as viewing Africans as heathens unable to govern themselves. Afrikaner solidarity and mythologies emerged as a result of their destruction at Britain’s hands during and following the war.

After the British claimed victory, liberal British realized the horror accompanying the defeat of the Afrikaners. Sparked by an international as well as a national outcry, the British government sent the Ladies Commission led by Emily Hobhouse, a 41 year old English spinster, to tour the concentration camps. She found death camps lacking the basic necessities of food, clean water, and protection from sun and cold. Lloyd George, a Liberal politician accused the government of using a “policy of extermination” in the camps. Emily Hobhouse commented, “it will always be remembered that this is the way British rule started here.” Hobhouse’s fifteen page report to the Committee of the Distress Fund reached Britain during a time of shifting sentiment as the liberals were taking power. This new group of English leaders, ashamed to be associated with such human destruction, realized the international respect they would lose in such an affiliation.

By employing such destructive measures to gain victory, the British lost any moral ascendancy over the Afrikaners whose mythology strengthened their solidarity. Entering the peace talks mindful of Afrikaner resentment and hoping not to ostracize them further, for fear of Afrikaner retaliation, the British had little clout in negotiations. While Britain demanded enfranchisement for all white South Africans in the Transvaal, it granted the Afrikaner states a relatively large degree of autonomy. Britain granted the states self-government in hopes that its influence through British immigration and Anglicization would peacefully bring British control. The concession the British made with the greatest impact on the African population considered their enfranchisement. The Peace Treaty of Veerniging, signed on May 31, 1902, resolved that the question of African enfranchisement would be addressed after the introduction of self-government. The British knew this stipulation would never be addressed when the Afrikaners were in office, but would rather create a life for the Africans much like that before the war.

Though the British had little access to the political arena, they attempted to influence the social arena of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Anglicization became a major method used to wipe out the Dutch influence and foster a new generation of pro-British. State schools’ teachers instructed in English and promoted British rule in their classrooms. The new British system gave Afrikaner parents the impression that the British were removing all traces of Dutch heritage. Nevertheless, the Afrikaners proved difficult to penetrate through educational systems as most Afrikaner parents placed little value in education. Many families believed that one year of school proved sufficient, giving the teachers barely any time to develop British sympathizers. Private schools were set up with Dutch and Afrikaans as the language of instruction for those Afrikaners who believed in the necessity of education. By attempting to foster an acceptance of British rule, the policy of Anglicization only increased Afrikaner Nationalism.

While the British tried to penetrate Afrikaner society, they also relied on a ‘land scheme’ involving British immigration to increase the amount of pro-British voters. The theory behind granting self-government in the Peace of Veerniging relied on substantial British immigration to peacefully gain control of the Transvaal. The British government advertised the prosperous gold mining industry hoping to incite immigration, but took no further actions to ensure a political victory. However, the plan backfired since British immigration failed to produce numbers constituting a majority. Even among the Uitlander population in the Transvaal, the Afrikaner party Het Volk capitalized on divisions over pro-Boer versus Imperialists. The Jameson Raid remained in everyone’s memories. Jameson’s inconsideration of the Uitlanders’ sentiments leading up to the rebellion gave English-speaking Transvaalers the impression that the British officials disregarded their opinions. The Uitlander population remained a minority of voters, but even among those living in the Transvaal, only a fraction voted in favor of the British. Reliance on the land scheme resulted in the clear victory of the Afrikaner party Het Volk in 1907 with General Louis Botha becoming Prime Minister. After winning the election, Afrikaner power continued to rise.

Fearing growing Afrikaner supremacy, the British government raised the idea of unification among the four colonies. British official Lionel Curtis initiated the establishment of a union by authoring the Selbourne Memorandum in January 1907. Unification offered incentives to both groups of the white population. Ronald Hyam maintains that the Afrikaners saw unification as enabling them to “assert themselves against the magnates, be rid of British interference, and to create a firm base for Afrikaner national expansion.” By unifying with the English-speaking South Africans the Afrikaners hoped to take back South Africa as promised in their mythology. Many English-speaking South Africans also wished to break away from their mother country. These South Africans felt that Britain did not always consider the South Africans, demonstrated by the Jameson Raid, so they had no incentive to support Britain. Both white populations decided such a move would prove beneficial, but what about the African population composing a drastic majority of the country?

The African Native Congress recounts the main objectives in formation of the Union for the white population to “consolidate their control over the land to the exclusion of the black majority”. The Peace of Veerniging eliminated the possibility of African enfranchisement in 1902, and nothing had changed since. Britain once again feared they might alienate the Afrikaners by demanding the franchise for Africans. British officials could justify their silence by referring to the American South where the government enfranchised Blacks against the opinion of many Whites. White Americans still treated Blacks abhorrently as racial violence and segregation remained rampant despite Black enfranchisement. Ronald Hyamin defends British silence in defending Africans by noting Britain’s good, though misguided, intentions for the Africans. The British Liberals did not consider enfranchisement sufficient for the needs of the Africans. Rather, they believed Africans would benefit more from “development of native institutions on native lines under Paternalistic guidance.” Regardless of the justifications the British presented, Britain’s irresponsibility allowed a new era of African opression once the Union took control.

The first election under the Union of South Africa in May 1910 proved the British Liberals’ disillusionment in hoping for a victory. The Afrikaner South African Party defeated the English Progressive Party, electing General Louis Botha as Prime Minister. Botha appointed Jan Smuts as Minister of Interior, Mines, and Defense, and General J.B.M. Hertzog as Minister of Justice. The relationship between these three officials indicated tension from the start. Hertzog believed that Smuts and Botha sacrificed Afrikaner interest in sympathizing with British interests. Botha and Smuts found Hertzog’s rabble-rousing complaints creating unnecessary divisions among the Afrikaners. The tension mounted until Hertzog resigned in 1912. In the aftermath of Hertzog’s resignation, he formed the National Party influenced by the myth of Apartheid. Espousing strong Afrikaner ideals, the National Party won the 1914 election, creating a new dimension to the African’s role in South Africa.

Strict policy regarding Africans emerged under the National Party influenced by the Myth of Apartheid. One of the first policies in the dawn of Apartheid materialized regarding African residency. Out of 4,500,000 black people throughout the country, 1.75 million resided in locations reserved for Africans, around _ million lived in municipalities or in urban areas, around one million squatted on European farms, and the rest were employed in public or private service jobs. On June 14, 1913 however, those one million squatters lost their homes with the passage of the Native’s Land Act. This bill stipulated that no African could purchase land, nor that a white person could purchase land in the scheduled areas for Africans. By disqualifying whites from purchasing land, the Afrikaner government ensured that British concern for African interests would remain low. In truth, no white person, or any person in general, would ever want to live in the horrendous conditions in the scheduled areas.

The African population, the group directly affected by the Native’s Land Act, had no voice to protest it under the Union constitution. Although few people in the government listened to their concerns, Africans remained alert to the status of the Bill. They pleaded for the rejection of this bill, but to no avail. Without the protection of the franchise guaranteeing a degree of civil rights, the lives of the Africans were completely in the hands of the white government.

In the late 1800s when the Uitlanders found themselves disenfranchised, like the Africans following unification, they relied on British support to take control of the Transvaal. With the heightened British fear of losing their empire, protecting British supremacy within South Africa ensured their power in the international community. Unwilling to accept British rule, the Afrikaners resisted through continual struggle to take and maintain control. Beginning as a power struggle between the white groups, the resulting political situation offered the setting for legislation taking away African rights. Although the theories behind Apartheid were born in the Afrikaner mythology, blaming only the Afrikaners for the tragic system completely overlooks Britain’s role in creating an atmosphere receptive to Apartheid. Although racism always ruled South African relationships between the indigenous and colonizing populations, Apartheid became possible as an outcome of bickering over control. By maintaining their empire, the British inadvertently sacrificed the Africans’ control over their lives for 80 years.

Bibliography
1. Sacks, Benjamin. South Africa : An Imperial Dilemma, Non-Europeans and the British Nation, 1902-1914. New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press, 1967.
2. “The Role of Black People in the War.” http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/black.html 22 Nov. 2003.
3. Thompson, Leonard. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.

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