Love and Freedom

By Susan Linich

 

What is love?  Is it something we do or something we can know?  Some classify love as something that you feel for some people sometimes.  It is often linked or used interchangeably with lust.  Others feel that it is something that is constant and untouched by judgement and feeling.  The only common denominator for love is that it is something that is desirable; it is something that we want.  So what do people want?  Many philosophies pose answers; but those answers frequently lead to more questions.  Examining Sartre’s idea of love from Being and Nothingness, we find a love that is an action in the form of a project.  The goal of the project is to attain a totality of being through the use of another.  This differs from the love outlined by Socrates in Plato’s Symposium.  Through Socrates, Plato characterizes love as a desire to partake in the beautiful for the purpose of gaining happiness.  Sartre states that love is an engagement in an impossible project.  Plato, while agreeing that the task is not easy, feels quite differently that love is attainable.  This paper seeks to find they areas where the two philosophies overlap, hoping that an even better definition or goal of love can be reached. In order to understand Sartre’s idea of love, we must first examine his ontology.  This will lead us to why love is sought. 

First, there is a distinction between what is free and what is determined: our consciousness exists as a freedom, for-itself, that can transcend any element that is not part of the present consciousness.  The human being is a freedom that is able to detach itself through a “nihilating withdrawal.”[1]  This means that the person who talks with others and lives in the world with people can choose at any moment to alter the world because it is her world to alter through her freedom.  This may happen because the possibility for anything has underneath it an implicit nothingness.  As consciousness considers all other objects and existence, it realizes that none of it needs to exist.  The consciousness may find these objects to exist elsewhere or not at all.  This realization is the nihilation of these objects and other forms of existence as they pertain to the conscious for-itself. 

A strange consequence of this phenomenon is the separation of the conscious present for-itself from its own past being or future being through a barrier of nothingness. Sartre gives many reasons for this.  First, the self which the consciousness will be, or has been is not what the consciousness is at present.  This issue is a time related one.  Second, Sartre says that what the consciousness is does not provide the “foundation” of what the consciousness will be.  The consciousness could be related to the present self but, in fact, freedom allows that it could be anything.  Therefore, no relation is implicit.  Sartre’s last reason seems to reiterate the concept that is already given: the present consciousness does not have a determining factor in the future self.  The future self is a constantly renewing consciousness that freedom wills.  All of this is most concisely put when Sartre says, “I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it.”[2]  As distance is created, the present self realizes its alienation from its past and its future self.  This is the “nihilating structure of temporality.”[3]  When the consciousness realizes this separation, it begins to understand that the freedom that it is becomes a burden of constant self-renewal.  An anguish will exist over the relation of the past and future as it pertains to present existence.  Questions will haunt the present consciousness toward what it may regard as negative characteristics of its past being.  The present being will wonder if it may again become the past self.  However, the consciousness will always have the ability to separate its present self from its past self so that the past self becomes like an object for the present self to consider. 

The anguish over the future occurs in the realization that the present self is the future self in the mode of not being it.  Sartre states, “The self which I am depends on the self which I am not yet (future) to the exact extent that the self which I am not yet does not depend on the self which I am.”[4]  This again, refers to the element that once in the future, the now present self will then be the past self, which we have already determined has no bearing on the future self which will be, at that time, the present self.   So there may exist in the present self anguish both over what it has been and what it may choose to become.  He writes, “Essence is all that human reality apprehends in itself as having been.  It is here that anguish appears as an apprehension of self inasmuch as it exists in the perpetual mode of detachment from what is; better yet, in so far as it makes itself exist as such.”[5]  So the self is separated from its essence by the nothingness its freedom creates.  

As the self flees from anguish, Sartre shows that “bad faith” is in assistance.  There are some important conclusions drawn in the discussion of “bad faith.”  In each instance a “vacillation” exists between two elements of the self.  In the patterns of bad faith listed by Sartre the self seeks to escape its freedom by twisting the truth of the reality of existence.   The full discussion of bad faith is not necessary here.  Instead, the conclusions drawn in the discussion of bad faith can lend to a fuller idea of the problems that the self experiences.   

First, he concludes, “I am my transcendence in the mode of being a thing.”[6]  Here the body, the in-itself, is justifiably as much a valid part of the person as the transcendence, or for-itself, is.  While the transcendence cannot escape the in-itself completely, neither can it gain true knowledge of self through it. 

Second, I am my being for others in the mode of being what I am not.  This means that as being-for-others the person will be limited as an object would, as their body is also a limited determined being.  However, the person is also being-for-self and so is faced with their own freedom-for-self.  Again, a seeming knowledge may be gained of self as it pertains to other’s perception of the self, but since the for-itself can transcend beyond this perception, it is cannot really be that self—the self that others see. 

Third, it is impossible to be what one is.  As has been already established, the temporality of existence allows for constant change so that one may not simply be anything.  They exist both as it and not as it.  For Sartre, “…as soon as we posit ourselves as a certain being, by a legitimate judgment, based on inner experience or correctly deduced from a priori or empirical premises, then by that very positing we surpass this being—and that not toward another being but toward emptiness, toward nothing.”[7] 

There are problems that exist for a being that cannot connect to all aspects of itself.  The consciousness is referred to as the for-itself.  The other parts of the self, the body, the being-for-others, and being-as-past, are referred to as the in-itself.  Since the freedom of the for-itself creates the nothingness that separates it from the in-itself, the for-itself experiences a lack of itself as in-itself.[8]  Sartre writes, “The for-itself in its being is failure because it is the foundation only of itself as nothingness.”[9]  So human beings fail because their nature dictates that freedom will always stand in the way of self-knowledge and identity.  The consciousness desires to know itself and cannot.  The consciousness has its freedom but would prefer to be something for-itself.  However, if it could be an identity it would become limited, and since it is unlimited through freedom, it would cease to be what it is.  The for-itself is a freedom.  Beyond that there is nothing positive and concrete to say.  The consciousness yearns to be something.  The for-itself exists as a being that can create value through action but can never actually be the value to which the action is pointing.[10]  Again, if the for-itself could be value, it would be concrete, defined, and finite in potential.

All of Sartre’s ideas regarding love are built on the foundation of this understanding of human existence.  It is the lack of value, the lack of identity that will cause people to turn to one another for assistance.  The hope is that through the mediation of the other the self will be able to gain knowledge of identity.  Each person appeals to another.  This stems from the belief that “the other holds the secret—the secret of what I am.”[11] Love is the project of being loved for the purpose of finding being-in-itself through being-for-others.  Shame and pride tell the consciousness that others exist.  While being-for-others imprisons the self as in-itself, it also promises that there is someone who knows what I am. 

However, this is faulty for the reasons that have already been established.  If the other is capable of telling the self who and what it is then it is only viewing it as an object.  The self, still hoping for identity, will purposefully make itself appear as object so that the other may validate its existence as value and positivity.  The self wishes to view itself through the other’s eyes.  This is dangerous because the other is then in the powerful situation of determining what the self is.  This limits the potential of the self to be only what the other has decided that it is and ultimately the self loses its freedom.

The lover and the loved will exist much like the vacillation between the parts of the self.  Only one can exist as subject and so the other has lost its transcendence but inevitably will cause the other to lose his transcendence when the other, seeking love by loving, causes himself to appear as object for the self.  Neither lover can know the other as subject.  Consciousness cannot be known because it is surrounded by nothingness.  Love must fail because of the nature of human existence.  Sadly, it is this same nature that will always cause the self to seek this love. 

So Sartre’s love is an action which has the motive of an incomplete being searching for its whole existence.  Its failure is caused by the impossibility of a being-for-itself to commune with another being-for-itself.  How does this idea of love compare to that of Plato’s? 

The Symposium offers many ideas from each person in the dialogue of what love is, ranging from the act of lust, to the act of nurturing another person to become better.  Plato’s idea of love is conveyed through the voice of Socrates who gives reference to a female mystic, Diotima. Much of Plato’s idea of love remains elusive.  Even so, there is some direction that is given in order to gain an understanding of what love is.

Through the mythology given by Diotima, we learn that love is a powerful spirit that is the son of Resource and Need.[12]   This leads to love being needy.  So far this seems to agree with Sartre.  However, what love is needy for separates the two philosophies.  Since Love was conceived on the day that Aphrodite was born, Love seeks to love the beautiful.  However, this is not a love that is exclusive from or inclusive only to superficial beauty. 

Plato’s Love loves all beauty and seeks to make the beautiful his own in order to gain happiness.[13] The important distinction made is that love is not a search for a person’s other half.  He writes,“Love never longs for the half or the whole of anything except for the good.”[14] In this definition, it is further qualified that Love longs “not for the beautiful itself, but for the conception and generation that the beautiful effects.”[15]  Whether it is through procreation or creation of art, mankind is seeking happiness and immortality.

This seeking leads to the possibility of a true experience with love.  Diotima then explains how love of beauty leads one through many steps toward the universal beauty.  First, a person will “fall in love with the beauty of one individual body.”  The person will soon realize the similarity of one beauty to another and will then begin the project of loving all beautiful bodies.  After this, the person must be graduate to the understanding that the beauty of the soul exceeds the beauty of the body.  Following this, the person will begin to love all forms of knowledge.  If the person truly seeks to love these various kinds of knowledge, he will inevitably encounter universal beauty.

The universal form of beauty is described as “an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every worshiper as it is to every other.”  It is a “vision” that is “neither words, nor knowledge, nor a something that exists in something else…subsisting of itself and by itself in eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes of it in such a sort…that it will never be more nor less.”[16] While this language becomes mystical in its ambiguity, it is also telling of some important aspects of this form. This entire process is project of Love that Plato describes.  It is what leads to the “sanctuary of Love.”[17] 

In short, Plato’s Love seeks to be the lover, not the beloved.  Love seeks to partake of beauty in its most abstracted and pure form.  This means stepping away from a beauty that is limited by the manifestations of culture.  Love seeks the happiness that will be gained through this relationship. 

Sartre’s love is a project in futility toward uniting the self with the self.  Plato’s love is a project in mysticism toward uniting the self with the pure form of beauty.  Plato’s love is only in its early stages when it seeks to love a body.   From there it must move in order to complete its project.  Perhaps we can synthesize some of Sartre’s philosophy with some of Plato’s: loving is good if we do not love others as a solid limited object but as pure potentiality toward truth and beauty.

In this sort of love, it would be necessary to love oneself as well as all other beings.  If hate exists toward another, the hate would impel itself toward the self since each person is equally capable of any heinous act.  This love is an abstracted love.  The love that Sartre’s individual seeks longs for a totality of being and seeks for the other to define her. The beloved would have to understand that she would never be known or understood by the lover as anything other than potential. 

Loving would only make sense by an understanding that it is a constant renewal.  The lover is free to stop loving at any time, so what is to stop the lover from loving when his beloved does not seem worthy?  Again, the lover would have to recognize that the freedom that exists in each person allows the potential for any person to become unworthy at any time.  This makes each person equally worthy and unworthy.  Love would have to be unconditional.  Also, if the person understands that the other is like her own consciousness, then she will know that the person both is and is not whatever they perceive them to be.  Still, this does not stop the freedom of the individual from ending her love merely on a level of should/should not. 

Here it may be beneficial to refer to Sartre’s lecture Existentialism is a Humanism.  As Sartre refers to existence as it precedes essence, he notes that the burden of responsibility is greater as it pertains to living rightly.[18]  So, while the each person would have the freedom to not love, if one is to think in terms of what is good for the whole, then he will love the whole—without condition. 

Sartre would not agree with this still.  He would see it all as either leading to the self escaping the self through objectifying itself, or he would see the self objectifying others.  Indeed, it is difficult within Sartre’s philosophy to see a way out.  However, it would seem that the rungs of the ladder in the Symposium lead to love as an abstraction.  Perhaps this abstraction of the other need not objectify him.   Instead, perhaps the project of loving properly would be thinking not of the other but of the whole and of the whole then of myself also.  In this, I would affirm myself as existing as one who loves.  My answer to whom I am is most definitely whomever I make myself, so the project is on going.  I would only objectify myself if I seek another to love me and turn myself into an object in order to find that love.  So maybe the project should be limited to loving others, and loving others would mean accepting their freedom.  One could accept love from others but could not seek it out.

If I could then define myself as one who loves, then while I am that person, I would seek nothing.  Sartre says, “A being which is what it is, to the degree that it is considered as being what it is, summons nothing to itself in order to complete itself.”[19]   Sartre would still say that I will be troubled by my lack of knowledge of my in-itself.  Maybe this is why Plato’s love moves away from bodies.  It is true that we would be fleeing our in-itself.  But since this does not take away from our freedom and our responsibility, why is it so bad? 

Also, what of Sartre’s allusion to the ability to move toward authenticity through self-recovery of being?  He leaves this only as a footnote at the end of his section on bad faith.  Sartre seems to be playing a somewhat mystical role by leaving authenticity as a potential with no explanation of how to attain it.  Sartre does this again during his discussion of le regard.  He mentions an absolute reality of transcendental consciousness.[20]  Again, he does not explain how to attain it, or even what exactly it is.  Finally, Sartre’s footnote regarding “an ethics of deliverance and salvation”[21] is either a cruel joke on his part, or a sincere effort to get us to seek a better way that must exist. 

Plato’s Love seeks to be united with the beautiful. It is always loving the beautiful.  So Love always takes the role of the lover.  The vision of beauty is not being, but value.  Perhaps, loving would be a goal toward partaking of a constant good will toward others that does not limit being. Love should be, like so many virtues, something we strive for because it is right.  Existentially, there is no way of knowing if the lover will love me tomorrow.  I can hope that he will, but within his freedom anything is possible.  My anxiety may cause me to wonder if I will love the other tomorrow.  So love is love by the proactive free choice that is made moment to moment.  In this sense, how we love will be as different as each person and situation is, so that freedom will always be needed to confirm it. 

Of course, there is no answer that this paper can nicely put together.  If there were, everyone would know it already and we would all be loving, instead of discussing love.  Certainly Sartre’s examination of love beautifully details the failures of relationships.  What it does not do is explain the peace that can be gained when people let go of trying to control the other.  This is also a phenomenological reality, yet Sartre seems to ignore it.  Or perhaps, he never experienced it.  I must assert myself within Sartre’s framework when he says, “let each refer to his own experience.”[22] While the subject of Sartre’s discussion in the excerpt is not love, the idea still remains that each person’s experience should guide him.  Sartre felt that love was desire to be loved.  I wonder if the desire to be accepted is not the real desire.  Would not the love seem greater if the person being loved knew that the person loving them loved them in their free state, understanding all of the implications? 

With that I would say that love would be love when it leaves desire for identity behind and instead seeks only to love the whole.  Love will cease to be love when it objectifies or limits anyone.  Love should be what seeks the good of the whole.  Love should be the embracing of the freedom of the self and of others.  Then it will be both responsible and non-judgmental.    Though the problem of the in-itself still remains, it will not remain forever.